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I. INTRODUCTION
This is an exciting book.1 Not only is it a tour de force of all the
important moral issues relating to genetics, but it is written by what can
only be called a dream team of bioethicists.2 For the past quarter
century, these four individuals have exerted a profound influence on the
creation and direction of the field of bioethics, and now this book will
surely be the starting point for ethical work on genetics into much of the
new century.
* Professor of Law and Public Health, Wake Forest University.
1. ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE
(2000).
2. This team is composed of the following members: Allen Buchanan, Dan W.
Brock, Norman Daniels, and Daniel Wikler.
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In this brief Essay, I focus on chapter 4 of the book’s discussion of the
distinction between treatment and enhancement.3 This distinction is at
the core of many of the most challenging problems of ethics and public
policy raised by genetics. This is also the place where there appears to
be disagreement or ambivalence among these authors4 and where fault
lines appear in their otherwise remarkably united front.
II. THE AUTHORS’ ARGUMENT
Because the analysis in chapter 4 is complex and subtle, I will begin
with a summary outline of it so that I can more precisely identify the
location and importance of the points I want to address within the
chapter’s overall structure. Chapter 3 lays the groundwork with the
important insight that genetics radically alters the conventional domain
of distributive justice.5 No longer can we assume that the distribution of
personal traits and characteristics is beyond the reach of distributive justice,
subject only to luck or natural forces. Instead, we must contemplate the
serious possibility that many of our constitutive characteristics can be
chosen and engineered. This awesome ability will depend on access to
genetic technologies, which has profound implications for how to think
about resource allocation and redistribution and about social entitlements
and duties. I largely agree with how these issues are presented and analyzed
at a general, conceptual level in chapter 3.6
Chapter 4 then takes the analysis to a somewhat more concrete level.
It asks whether, in the imagined world of vastly expanded technological
control over genetics, we should think differently about fixing genetic
diseases than we do about enhancing genetic traits.7
First, the authors argued, and I agree, that enhancement versus
treatment is a meaningful distinction;8 one with considerable ambiguity
in close cases but one that has and will retain practical significance,
even if the line shifts or cannot be precisely drawn. In my view, the
distinction is based on concepts of normality that are a fundamental
aspect of human psychology, deeply and biologically imbedded in how
3. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 104–55.
4. See id. at 149.
5. Id. at 63.
6. See id. at 61–103. One point of disagreement is that, in stressing a
requirement of genetic intervention to correct natural or social inequalities, the authors
appear to go much further than necessary toward raising troubling issues of personal
autonomy. See id. at 77–79. There is no reason to even suggest or suppose that
distributive justice might require forcing corrective measures on competent adults who
do not want them for themselves or for their children. The requirement at issue is one
imposed on society to provide access or funding.
7. See id. at 104–55.
8. See id. at 109–10.
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we perceive and conceptualize patterns of variation in any realm of
experience. Even if the particulars change in what we view as being
normal, the underlying concept of normality and therefore of corrections
versus enhancements will remain.
Second, the authors considered various objections to giving this
distinction moral weight. They considered the apparent arbitrariness of
drawing such a line,9 illustrated with examples from current practices by
health insurers in deciding what to cover under the concept of “medical
necessity.”10 The authors provided a nuanced and insightful analysis of
some of the practicalities in designing and interpreting a set of health
insurance benefits.11
Following this, the authors addressed arguments that, even if the
distinction between treatment and enhancement is sensible and practical,
this distinction does not define what is ethically permissible or
obligatory.12 In other words, it is not a faithful proxy for underlying,
fundamental, moral constructs. Giving special moral status to treatment
and viewing enhancement as problematic may be either underinclusive
or overinclusive of how we would resolve particular moral questions
from a more fundamental vantage point.
Fourth, the authors’ primary response to these imagined attacks was to
invoke Norman Daniels’s well-known position that distributive justice
requires society to do what is feasible to maintain the normal species
functioning that is necessary for each person to have a fair range of
opportunities.13 The distinction between treatment and enhancement
does not perfectly match the normal functioning concept, but it is close
enough to serve as a practical proxy or surrogate for the more
fundamental principle.
Fifth, the authors considered why distributive justice does not require
that genetic enhancements be used or restricted to produce a more
perfectly level version of equality.14 They observed that seeking perfect
equality of opportunity is unrealistic because of practical limitations and
competing values.15 Liberty concerns keep us from restricting others’
abilities, opportunities, or accomplishments simply in order to achieve
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See id. at 110–18.
Id. at 110–12.
See id. at 112–13.
See id. at 118–21.
See id. at 121–23, 126–30.
See id. at 129–30.
See id. at 127–28.
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perfect equality with those least advantaged—“leveling down.”16 In the
past, biological and resource limitations greatly restricted what could be
done to improve the physical and mental functioning of the
disadvantaged—“leveling up.” Therefore, so far we have been forced to
tolerate sizeable inequalities.
Genetics, however, creates the potential to greatly reduce the
opportunity gap with powerful and inexpensive tools for altering
fundamental human abilities. Therefore, the authors acknowledged that
the argument for expanding health care entitlements beyond treatment of
disease becomes much stronger.17 However, they maintained that these
possible uses of genetic enhancement should be considered exceptional,
case-by-case departures from the disease model and not part of the basic
conceptual framework for health care entitlements.18
III. MY CRITIQUE
My critique of this argument focuses on the fourth, fifth, and last
points above. These points are the most critical and the ones where my
disagreement is most pronounced. My approach to these issues will not
have nearly the same philosophical sophistication as these authors
brought to bear. Instead, I will use a more intuitive analysis, informed
by my understanding of the issues in the second point, namely, how
health insurance works and why it is structured the way it is.
A. Versions of Equality
The authors started their analysis with Norman Daniels’s normal
species functioning position19 and then asked whether any significant
deviation or alteration is justified by genetics.20 For a project this
ambitious, one that considers issues at such a fundamental level and
reflects on the potentially radical significance of futuristic genetic
technologies, I think it is incumbent to go further back in the chain of
reasoning that produced the normal functioning position. That requires
us to consider the fundamental aims of distributive justice.
As a starting point for thinking about equality, I believe that most
people hold the untutored instinctive view that the authors label the
“brute luck” version of equality.21 However, this is only the starting
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
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point, not the ending position, for ethical analysis. People by and large
believe that it is unfair to limit opportunities based on factors not within
their control. Therefore, it is the general aim of distributive justice to
correct for misfortunes produced by the natural lottery. However, after a
moment’s reflection, we realize this cannot be fully accomplished
because of competing practical and value based reasons, as noted above.
Concerns about individual liberty prevent us from denying opportunities
and accomplishments to the more fortunate simply to close the gap. Our
technical and economic abilities to assist the less fortunate are inherently
limited. Therefore, society adopts compromise versions of equality that
seem, in the circumstances, to best accommodate these competing pulls.
How these competing forces are best resolved will differ across time
and among social spheres.22 Sometimes we may settle on correcting
only abnormal deficits, but other times we seek to improve normal
abilities; or we may sometimes strive for a decent minimum standard,
while in other arenas we attempt to achieve a fairly level form of
equality. These versions are not determined once and for all by
fundamental moral principles; they are worked out at a more pragmatic
level where the solutions are subject to fairly radical revision as
circumstances change.
Consider, for instance, education. We are born with a wide range of
abilities and opportunities to learn and think. Society seeks to equalize
these mental attributes through a highly egalitarian system of publicly
funded schools that, ideally, seeks to achieve more than a decent
minimum. However, achieving perfect equality and correcting abnormal
deficits are not the primary goals. Traditionally, public education has
sought to enhance mental skills starting from a normal range of abilities.
It encourages the best and brightest to achieve the most, and, until recent
decades, it did not do much to address the needs of the mentally
handicapped. The last point has changed markedly, however, due to
increased resources and technical abilities. We now know much more
about educational techniques for learning disabilities and mental
handicaps, and society is able to devote more resources to this purpose
than before.
The version of equality that exists now for health care is
fundamentally different. In this sphere, the principal focus is on disease,
22. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES
EQUALITY 3–6, 10 (1983).
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and most resources go to those with the greatest needs. However, the
goal is not to provide equal amounts of the best possible health care to
everyone. Instead, we accept wide disparities in access as long as a
decent minimum level of care is available through hospital emergency
rooms and government sponsored clinics. These compromises are
driven not only by resource limitations but also by the practical realities
of health care. It is possible with food, housing, education, and other
similar necessities of life to distribute the basic social minimum in more
or less equal increments through vouchers or by providing the service
directly. The extraordinarily diverse nature of medical needs, however,
means they cannot be met through any notion of equal or similar
increments of service. Therefore, the only way to meet our humanitarian
commitment to a decent level of health care is to provide guaranteed
access to a comprehensive range of services, which we do through social
insurance programs—Medicare and Medicaid. Because health related
benefits are potentially limitless, however, insurance would not be
affordable without constraints on what and how much is covered.23 This
is the principal role of the medical necessity criterion, which is
interpreted in a way that emphasizes the treatment of disease.
These features of health insurance are subject to change, however, as
technical abilities, available resources, and structural aspects of medicine
change. If these attributes change radically, so too may our concept of
health care equality. The authors entertained these possibilities,24 but
dismissed or minimized them too readily. To demonstrate that health
care equality is not inherently limited to disease, I consider further the
status of enhancements in current medical and insurance practices and
whether this secondary status is inevitable.
B. Treatment of Disease Versus Enhancement of Health
For centuries, disease has been the defining concept of the sphere
of medicine. Disease determines the goals, attitudes, techniques, and
justification for what medicine is and does. However, this is not an
absolute or unalterable condition, and it may be undergoing radical
revision. Over the second half of the twentieth century, health, rather
than disease, has emerged as a competing concept of equal importance
that points in a somewhat different direction. Maintaining and
improving health encompasses disease but is not limited to disease.
Health promotion emphasizes disease prevention as well as correction.
23. MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING
AND ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS 5–6 (1997).
24. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 123.
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Alternative, more holistic, views of health underscore the possibility of
achieving a sense of health even in the presence of unconquerable
disease. Health also introduces a more generalized notion of well-being
that allows medicine to enter other arenas of life, such as diet, exercise,
and various sources of stress.25
These changes have been operative not only in notions of what doctors
may permissibly do but also in respect to what insurance is obligated to
cover under the concept of medical necessity. My own recent physical
exam is a case in point. I had not had a physical in ten years, and,
entering my mid forties, I wanted a thorough going over. First, it is
notable that I had nothing wrong, yet my insurance covered the full cost.
Based on prior experience, I expected a battery of tests, probes, and the
like, which I received; but I was surprised to learn that this was
incidental to what my visit was mainly about. The visit began with a
long questionnaire about my general happiness; my job; my marriage;
what I eat, drink, and smoke; how well I am sleeping; and how much I
exercise. Anything I marked that was potentially troubling, my doctor
raised in our lengthy conversation, which occupied about two-thirds of
the checkup. This conversation convinced me to join a health club and
to begin exercising regularly for the first time in my life. I now have
more energy, I sleep better, and I do not use alcohol as much as I once
did for stress reduction.
I think we would all agree that this is a model of good doctoring and
that this type of service should be included in a mandatory package of
health care benefits.26 Observe, however, that this service is only
tangentially addressed to disease; more immediately it is directed in
large part to health benefits achieved through enhancement. The physician
increased my awareness of these issues, and my exercise is enhancing
my previously good health as well as forestalling future illness.
However, if health insurance and medical practice encompass health
25. See generally ROBERT A. ARONOWITZ, MAKING SENSE OF ILLNESS: SCIENCE,
SOCIETY, AND DISEASE (1998); CONCEPTS OF HEALTH AND DISEASE (Arthur L. Caplan et
al., eds., 1981).
26. Norman Daniels objects that I fail to recognize that his normal functioning
concept is broader than the traditional disease focus of medicine because his formulation
also encompasses prevention and public health measures that modify social determinants
of health. Letter from Norman Daniels, to the Participants of the University of San
Diego School of Law Symposium, Genes and the Just Society (Feb. 2002) (on file with
author). However, this very progression in the scope of what medicine undertakes
makes my point that the proper domain of medicine has evolved, and likely will continue
to evolve, as information and technologies develop.
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enhancement, why does my health plan not pay for my health club
membership? Does this not indicate that the disease model still
prevails? Several responses come quickly to mind. First, the evolution
is only partial and incomplete. Second, some health plans do cover
health club membership or membership is sometimes paid for or
subsidized by employers. Third, to the extent insurers continue to resist
paying for exercise, this is likely for pragmatic reasons not for reasons of
principle. Countless aspects of life influence health, and so it is not
feasible for insurance to pay for all, or even most, beneficial
interventions that promote health. If health club membership were
allowed, what about mountain biking or downhill skiing? The
slipperiness of these slopes (pun intended) is the main reason for
limiting insurance coverage. The fact that these limits are articulated in
terms of medical necessity or connection to disease is due more to the
malleability of these concepts and their historical role in this realm than
to fundamental principle.
This loose understanding of insurance helps to place in proper context the
examples used by the authors to defend their position. They contrasted the
following: (i) two equally short boys, one with growth hormone deficiency
and the other without,27 and (ii) two equally shy adults, one with and one
without a diagnosable psychiatric condition.28 They correctly observed
that under current insurance practices, only the people whose condition
is caused by disease or injury will be covered.29 Nevertheless, the
authors read more significance into these somewhat selective examples
than is warranted.
Whether these examples are prototypical or exceptional depends on
how one frames the issue and from what point of view. There is no doubt
that the disease concept strongly influences insurance coverage and
medical practice. The issue is whether this is subject to evolutionary
change or substantial supplementation. Viewed over time, the very fact
that insurance covers any psychological counseling or any use of the
human growth hormone shows some evolution in our insurance based
concept of medical necessity. Whether this evolution finds its equilibrium
at this particular compromise or whether coverage expands or contracts
is determined by the practicalities of these particular conditions and so is
likely to follow different routes for each example. At present, coverage
of mental therapy appears to be splitting into two paths divided between
organic versus behavioral causes and treatments. The bioengineered
human growth hormone is extremely expensive and in somewhat short
27.
28.
29.
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supply; its proper use is still controversial and the long term effects
uncertain; and parents can assert very strong demands. Therefore,
physicians have, in a somewhat paternalistic manner, adopted very strict
and objective criteria for when it is even permissible to use the hormone,
and insurers have, for the most part, simply followed this medical
practice. If costs decrease or controversy over proper use abates, these
restrictions will probably loosen.
Even currently, the disease concept does not exert nearly the same
influence in other areas of medicine and insurance. I can easily have my
doctor prescribe sleeping pills, covered by insurance, merely based on
symptoms of insomnia, without regard to the underlying cause or any
diagnosable disease. Many other medical conditions are treated based
purely or primarily on symptoms rather than etiology. Common examples
include obesity, elevated cholesterol, and high blood pressure. In the
purely psychological realm, although it is controversial to prescribe
Prozac™ for general mood improvement, this increasingly is being done
and paid for by insurance, as it was for Valium®, using malleable mental
diagnoses that are clearly unrelated to any specific psychological etiology.
Some insurance covers, and some does not, in vitro fertilization for
infertile couples, but the disagreement is fundamentally not about whether
infertility is abnormal or whether it results from some other disease
condition. Instead, coverage variations result from concerns over the cost
of the procedure and whether the concentrated high demand for this
coverage undermines the ability to pool and spread these costs—what
economists refer to as “adverse selection.” Similar points apply to
contraception and Viagra®.30 Arguments for and against covering these
services may be framed in terms of disease, abnormality, and the like, for
those remain the operative concepts; but the pattern of results reached
does not consistently match any principled understanding of these
concepts. Rather, this pattern is driven by other, more pragmatic
considerations rooted in the institutional structure and economics of
insurance.
In sum, health insurance covers what doctors do, up to a limit; and
doctors do what is technically feasible and professionally acceptable in
order to promote health and well-being. Disease has been the dominant
conceptual guide to insurance because, in earlier decades, medical
30. See, e.g., Alison Keith, The Economics of Viagra, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr.
2000, at 147, 155.
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practice followed the disease model. But as medical practice and concepts
have evolved, so has insurance, subject to practical limitations of
maintaining affordable insurance. Disease based concepts of insurance
coverage contain inherent limitations that help confine insurance to more
easily defined and administered boundaries. Health and wellness do not
and so result in a jagged boundary, defined inconsistently from one case to
the next. This is nicely illustrated by the following satirical explanation
of why happiness (not its opposite) might easily be considered a
psychiatric disorder: “[H]appiness meets all reasonable criteria for a
psychiatric disorder. It is statistically abnormal [and] consists of a
discrete cluster of symptoms . . . .”31
[H]appiness is usually characterized by a positive mood, sometimes described
as “elation” or “joy,” although this may be relatively absent in the milder happy
states, sometimes termed “contentment.” . . . The behavioral components of
happiness . . . suggest that happy people are often carefree, impulsive, and
unpredictable in their actions . . . including a high frequency of recreational
interpersonal contacts and prosocial actions towards others identified as less
happy . . . .
. . . There is excellent experimental evidence that happy people are
irrational . . . . Happy people have been shown to exhibit various biases of
judgment that prevent them from acquiring a realistic understanding of their
physical and social environment. . . .
. . . Acceptance of these arguments leads to the obvious conclusion that
happiness should be included in future taxonomies of mental illness . . . . I
humbly suggest that the term ‘happiness’ be replaced by the more formal
description major affective disorder, pleasant type, in the interests of scientific
precision and in the hope of reducing any possible diagnostic ambiguities.32

C. Normal Species Functioning
Against this backdrop, how should we view the vast potential for
genetic enhancement? I am not convinced that the primary guide should
be whether a particular genetic technology responds to what we now
conceive of as a disease or abnormality. It is too easy to think of
compelling, contrary examples. Suppose, for instance, that genes could be
altered to allow people to feel fully rested and refreshed with only half as
much sleep, thereby extending effective waking time by four hours a day.
The need for sleep is a natural biological limitation, so a disease model
would not include this enhancement, yet the enhancement would have vast
potential for increasing abilities, opportunities, and life experiences.
These authors presumably would consider this as a possible exceptional
case that justifies departure from their disease based equality framework.
31. Richard P. Bentall, Words: A Proposal to Classify Happiness as a Psychiatric
Disorder, 18 J. MED. ETHICS 94, 97 (1992).
32. Id. at 96–97.
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But whether it should be an exception or part of the rule turns simply on
how many such cases one can expect, and the authors invited us to think
imaginatively. Even viewed as exceptional, resolving this and countless
other possibilities requires an appeal to principles and concepts more
fundamental than normal species functioning, which indicates that this
concept no longer will be a reliable guide.
There are a series of additional reasons I am not convinced that it will
make sense to adhere to the normal species functioning guide in an era
of vastly expanded genetic enhancement. Space does not permit full
development, but I will briefly outline them. First, even if the disease
model remains dominant, the vast expansion of genetic technologies is
almost certain to alter society’s sense of what is normal, and therefore
what is a disease. Over the course of the twentieth century, the range of
normalcy for many medical measures and conditions has shifted in sync
with external—nonmedical—social developments, including height,
weight, and the length of life. Thus, what is now considered clinically
significant obesity or a shortened life span is considerably different than
a century ago.33 Medicine is, thankfully, not wedded to an unalterable
concept of its proper domain.
The aspect of Daniels’s prescription that is in conflict with this view is
his stress on species normality.34 Were we to think simply in terms of
normal functioning, then the shift in biological and social norms would
encompass technologies that now are thought of as enhancements but in
the future may well be viewed as directed toward biological
abnormalities.35 This is especially likely after several generations of
germ line enhancements. I do not see in principles of distributive justice
the limitation that we consider only characteristics of the species in its
natural state. Normalcy may be the proper guide but normalcy is distinct
33. See generally James O. Hill & John C. Peters, Environmental Contributions to
the Obesity Epidemic, 280 SCIENCE 1371 (1998); Gary Taubes, As Obesity Rates Rise,
Experts Struggle to Explain Why, 280 SCIENCE 1367 (1998). These types of objective
measures are also culturally contingent even within a given time frame. For instance, the
body temperature considered normal varies by as much as a degree or two among
Western industrialized countries. See George J. Annas and Frances H. Miller, The
Empire of Death: How Culture and Economics Affect Informed Consent in the U.S., the
U.K., and Japan, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 357, 360 (1994). Similarly, I suspect, but I do not
really know for sure, that the level of cholesterol considered clinically troubling likely
varies from one medical system to another.
34. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 73–75, 121.
35. See generally Peter H. Huang, Herd Behavior in Designer Genes, 34 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 639 (1999).
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from naturalness, as the authors noted in chapter 3 of the book.36 This
point is also consistent with their concern that genetic enhancement may
aggravate disability discrimination.37
Finally, even if genetic enhancements were excluded from the domain
of distributive justice that applies to the sphere of medicine, we must
also consider how we would regard enhancements under other spheres
or, indeed, if genetics would become a new sphere of its own. Without
the current technologies of modern society, we would have no concept
of entitlement to transportation, and entitlement to welfare assistance
would make no sense without a monetary system. Genetics can be
expected to have an equally transformative impact on society.
Therefore, we must consider whether, apart from medicine or any
existing sphere, there will arise a sense of entitlement to genetic
services. If so, surely genetic enhancements will be included in the mix
because disease is a limitation imposed only in the sphere of medicine.
Even if this new sphere does not arise, genetic enhancements, such as
some of those the authors posit,38 might fall within the sphere of
education. Observe how, over the space of only a decade, we have come
to the view that using computers in the primary grades is essential to
providing an adequate range of future opportunities.
IV. CONCLUSION
I am fully convinced by the authors’ explanation that there is a deeply
pragmatic dimension to moral intuitions.39 We naturally intuit only the
range of options that are feasible and for which we have experience. In
the past, large scale improvement of baseline human traits was not
possible and still may never be feasible or become commonplace.
However, if this does come about, then surely our existing intuitions will
shift concerning the moral significance of the boundary between
treatment and enhancement. This does not mean that our intuitions are
fickle or are a poor guide. Instead, this forces us to think about the
deeper moral principles that underlie these intuitions. Doing so leads me
to conclude that the goal of distributive justice should be to achieve as
much equality of opportunity as is technically feasible without
compromising other important social and ethical demands.
For now, and within medicine, normal species functioning serves as a
reasonably reliable proxy for operationalizing this version of medical
equality. But when we begin to open our minds to the full potential of
36.
37.
38.
39.
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genetics, it is easy to conceive of a time when this will no longer be the
case. These authors did a very good job helping us think about what
these conditions may look like. My only criticism is that they struggle
too hard to hold onto an older notion of the goals of medicine and so are
too reluctant to let this evolution occur.
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